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Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, by Allan Gibbard. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990. pp. xi + 346. Reviewed by Ann E. Cudd, University 
bf Kansas. 
The puzzle that Allan Gibbard sets for himself is: what do we mean 
when we call something "rational", or more broadly, what are we doing 
when we engage in normative discussion, and why do we do it? Gibbard's 
response is to provide what he calls a "norm-expressivistic analysis" of 
norms, and to explain human preoccupation with normative discussion in 
Darwinian terms. To call something rational is to express one's 
acceptance of norms that permit it. Normative discussions consist in 
expressing norms, that is, in talking about what it makes sense to do or feel 
or believe. Humans engage in normative discussion for vast portions of 
our lives because it is biologically adaptive for us. 
Gibbard defends a non-cognitivist view of norms: when expressing 
norms, he claims, we are not stating facts (or putative facts) about the 
world. Facts play one biological role in our lives while norms and 
normative discussion play another, namely to help us to coordinate 
actions. Gibbard is concerned to give an account of norms that allows for 
everyday uses of the term "rational", and that accounts for the 
endorsement aspect of norms. For these reasons he rejects purely 
descriptive accounts of norms, and the "Hume-Ramsey" substantive ac-
count of rationality as instrumental rationality, which cannot make sense 
of claims that preferences are irrational. 
One of the main goals of his analysis is to provide a naturalistic 
account of norms and their role in human life. In Gibbard's terms this 
means a Darwinian natural selection story of how norms, and the kind of 
psychology that we need to create them, are evolutionarily adaptive for 
humans. Since human normative systems and emotional responses differ 
widely, the story has to be about very plastic psychic devices. "In applying 
Darwinian theory to the human psyche, we should look not for rigid 
patterns of behavior, but for capacities to respond differently to different 
environments" (p.64). If the story is persuasive, then this gives us reason to 
agree with Gibbard's non-cognitivism, and he will have solved an 
important puzzle about how norms could have emerged without tacitly 
appealing to prior norms. 
In his Darwinian story norms and judgments about our physical 
surroundings play very different roles. While the ability to make 
judgments about our physical surroundings is necessary for most animal 
functions, the abilities to create norms and engage in normative 
discussions are uniquely human adaptations that allow us to coordinate 
our actions, to cooperate for survival and for mutual advantage, and to do 
so in infinitely flexible ways. Humans typically face bargaining situations 
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with each other, situations where we stand to gain through cooperation but 
where there is a conflict of interest over the division of the gains. The 
solutions that humans take often involve norms (rather than fighting, 
which would destroy future cooperation), either in the form of rigid rules 
for splitting the cooperative effort or a framework for discussion of how 
norms of fairness or desert can be applied in a particular instance. Thus 
the ability to express norms linguistically is as essential to the story as the 
ability to be motivated to action by expressions of norms. 
Gibbard applies his analysis explicitly to norms for action (though he 
claims that only the intentions and preferences guiding actions can be 
judged), norms for appropriate emotions, epistemic norms governing 
belief formation, andespecially moral norms. His focus is not so much on 
the norms themselves, (indeed one ought not read this book looking for 
any practical normative advice), but rather on how discussions of norms 
can go at all: what moves them toward consensus. Given his non-
cognitivist approach there are some especially pressing concerns: Can his 
account be given a formal analysis? Can normative discussions be 
objective? Can we ever resolve normative disagreements? Can we make 
sense of the (typically cognitivist) question: why be moral? Gibbard argues 
for an affirmative answer to each of these. 
Perhaps the most important part of the book is Gibbard's account of 
morality and moral emotion. Gibbard's account of morality resembles, 
self-consciously, that of Adam Smith, with the important exception that 
Gibbard rejects (partly) that role of the impartial spectator. In particular, 
morality consists in judgments about the appropriateness of moral 
feelings. Anger and guilt are especially important on Gibbard's view as the 
primary moral emotions; societies in which persons do not feel guilt do not 
have morality on what he calls the "narrow construal". Moral norms are 
adaptive because they help us to share feelings, which in turn helps foster 
coordination and cooperation. Shared feelings of anger and guilt, and the 
ability to employ normative authority about attributions of anger and guilt, 
are especially effective in motivating cooperation. Emotions are cognitive 
on Gibbard's account, that is, we feel anger at someone, or we feel guilty, 
for something we have done or omitted. Anger and guilt properly come 
about when someone has failed to do his part. In moral inquiry we need 
not feel these emotions, rather we need to take a special standpoint: moral 
norms are norms for how to feel given full engagement. Full engagement 
is "vivid awareness of everything generic that would affect one's feelings 
toward a situation" (p.127). One's feelings are not often fully engaged, but 
the norms governing the emotions are to be discussed from this 
standpoint because taking such a stance ensures the best hope for sharing 
feelings, and so for cooperation. Gibbard takes from Smith the idea that 
moral emotions have a pragmatic role, but rejects the idea that the 
appropriate moral emotions are those which an impartial spectator would 
feel, since on Gibbard's view it is sometimes better for coordination if we 
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are not so impartial. I find this last point somewhat confusing in the text, 
however (Compare p. 127 and pp. 279-282). 
It may seem that objectivity would pose a special problem for norm-
expressivistic analysis. Gibbard spends the largest portion of the book (100 
pages) in giving an account of normative objectivity: how and to what 
extent it is possible on his analysis of norms. He divides the topic of 
objectivity into three issues to discuss: (1) what it means to say that a norm 
applies independent of one's acceptance of it; (2) the distinction between 
accepting something as demand of rationality and making idiosyncratic 
existential commitment to it; and (3) the nature of claim to authority about 
moral norm. The first issue is easily settled when one distinguishes 
between accepting a norm and expressing acceptance. Since his account 
is about when it is appropriate to express acceptance, he claims that 
normative discussions can be as interpersonal as talk about trees. The 
second issue is settled by appeal to higher order norms for rationality. 
Then "to accept a norm as a requirement of rationality is to accept it along 
with higher order norms that require its acceptance" (p.169). The third 
issue arises when we see that every normative discussion involves claims 
to normative authority, often conflicting ones. The question then is, how 
can normative discussions reach resolution? If the answer is that 
someone's normative expressions must be taken as authoritative, when 
does it make sense to take someone else as normative authority? 
I found the most interesting and illuminating parts of this book to be 
Gibbard's account of normative disagreement and its resolution. 
Normative discussions involve persons expressing norms, applying 
pressure on one another to accept their views of how norms govern the 
situations at hand. One way that a person can be persuaded to change her 
view is by pointing out an inconsistency in the norms that she accepts. The 
resulting emotion is embarrassment, and this normally causes one to 
reevaluate one's normative position. But Gibbard holds that consistency is 
only one meta-norm among several competitors, and even persons with 
coherent norms and beliefs can disagree. Given such deep seated 
disagreement, how can we agree to disagree? Gibbard outlines two 
general strategies for accepting disagreement: parochialism and 
relativism. Parochialism involves accepting some norms as, arbitrarily, 
beyond challenge, and then holding that those who do not accept those 
norms as outside one's normative community. This strategy may seem 
both theoretically unsatisfying and practically dangerous if the wrong 
combination of norms conflict. The alternative is relativism, which 
involves accepting higher order norms that allow (or even require) 
disagreement at lower orders, depending on the circumstances of 
everyday life. Again, this is unsatisfactory if the higher order norms 
conflict. Gibbard gives a sort of practical account of the results of 
disagreement. We choose between tolerance and (when we are in a 
position to do so) repression. Repression is costly because we desire 
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respect and repression makes that impossible. Tolerance assures mutual 
respect in the face of disagreement, but can be costly too when one has to 
tolerate serious breaches of one's norms. These are the costs that are 
weighed in deciding on a course of tolerance or of repression of conflicting 
norms. 
This book is an interesting attempt to understand norms by an 
important contemporary philosopher. It is a clear statement of a non-
cognitivist, naturalist account of norms, and a thoughtful examination of 
the complexities involved in trying to give a Darwinian grounding to 
ethical theory. It is very rich and suggestive, and leaves one wanting more. 
However, I have some doubts about the adequacy of the Darwinian 
analysis as a complete account of the origin norms. I wonder about the 
fact that legal, aesthetic, and etiquette norms were excluded, and how well 
they would fit into the analysis. My guess is that while they could each be 
given a coordination rationale, the latter two would fit only awkwardly. 
Epistemic norms, moral norms, and norms for other feelings are all 
pushed by facts or naturally based intuitions: the external world rules out 
certain kinds of epistemic judgments, as does the need for cooperation 
and our emotional capacities for the case of moral and emotional norms. 
And this may be true for the possible legal systems of norms that we could 
invent: some conceivable systems would not be adequate to the task of 
political survival and would result in their own demise. But for aesthetic 
and etiquette norms there are no such survival pressures at work; they 
seem to be completely arbitrary on this analysis. 
My biggest concern is with the adequacy of an analysis of morality 
that is centered on the emotions of guilt and anger. First of all it is not 
clear why Gibbard wants to so center the analysis, except that it 
conveniently fits his Darwinian story. But morality seems to me to involve 
other emotions, such as concern, love, a sense of fairness or justice, pride, 
sympathy, benevolence, sadness, and shame, to name a few standard 
examples. Now Gibbard might respond that though these are emotions 
guided by norms, all moral judgments can be understood as judgments 
about the appropriateness of feeling anger or guilt over some action, which 
might also have inspired these other emotions. To suggest a 
counterexample, imagine the following scenario. Recently a man plowed 
under a part of his land that was one of the last pieces of virgin prairie in 
eastern Kansas. I believe that what he did was morally wrong, that the 
predominant moral emotion was a sense of sadness or loss, and that anger 
at him is unjustifiable. 1 would argue that we cannot be angry because he 
had a right to do what he did since he owned the land, but we can be 
disappointed and sad because what he did diminishes us and lessens our 
community feelings. The actions of various members of the community 
lend evidence to my interpretation. Some people were angry and tried to 
protest by laying their bodies in the path of the tractor, but these people 
were removed by the sheriff, and many people considered their actions 
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fanatical. It was thought by the wider community that they had gone too 
far. Another group held a ritualistic ceremony of mourning. Others tried 
to buy the land before it was destroyed. These seemed to most people to 
be appropriate reactions. Surely his action was selfish, stubborn, and 
stupid. If I am right that this was immoral and yet anger was unjustified, 
then it seems that this would constitute a counterexample to Gibbard's 
construal of morality. However, it also seems that his analysis could be 
broadened and still preserve the Darwinian story; it seems clearly adaptive 
for us to want not to make each other sad, and to be perceived as generous 
and wise, for this preserves community and our individual place in it. 
Since Gibbard notes that there are many societies that do not have guilt, 
his construal of morality implies that they do not have morality. This is, 
< given my suggestion, unnecessarily ethnocentric. 
I want to add a final critical note about Gibbard's choice of norms 
governing the gender of pronouns, and about the images of women 
generally in his book. He continually uses the pronoun 'he' and the term 
'man' as if they were gender neutral. Since it is now a widespread practice, 
at least a competing linguistic norm, in analytic moral philosophy to use 
's/he', or 'she' and 'he' interchangeably, one can only read this as an 
unfortunate deliberate choice. Worse, women appear in five examples in 
the book, at least three of which are extremely negative stereotypic 
images: Cleopatra who is irrationally angry at the bearer of bad tidings, 
Delilah (and we all know what she did to Samson), and the coherent 
anorexic. In a book about what it makes sense to do and to feel, these 
images are rather insensitive. Perhaps this was less intentional, but I find 
it no less unfortunate. 
True and False Ideas, New Objections to Descartes' "Meditations" and 
Descartes' Replies, Antoine Arnauld, translated, with an Introduction by 
Elmar J. Kremer, (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1990), pp. xxxiv +198. Reviewed by Roy Martinez, Spelman College. 
Among his Cartesian contemporaries of seventeenth-century France, 
Arnauld was unquestionably a key intellectual figure. Singularly 
combative of spirit and prolific to boot, he managed to generate during his 
long life more than forty volumes of rigorously argued works dealing with 
various theological and philosophical concerns. Although known to most 
English-speaking readers as the author of the Fourth Objections to 
Descartes Meditations, Arnauld was a philosopher in his own right. If no 
where else, this assessment is especially vindicated in the book under 
review. 
What motivated Arnauld to write Des vraies et fausses idees 
(hereafter: Idees) was his conviction that Malebranche, particularly in his 
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Recherche de la verlle, not only misread Descartes but confounded 
matters by wittingly perpetuating ambiguities that might have been 
merely accidental in Descartes' texts. Amidst the complex of issues 
attended to by the Port-Royal logician in this book, those featuring the 
cognate concepts of perception and ideas serve as the foundation of the 
rigorous examination to which Malebranche's work is subjected. In 
accordance with a practice prevalent in his age, Arnauld proceeds more 
geometrico to demonstrate the inevitable contradictions involved in his 
adversary's arguments. As early as the fifth chapter, i.e., on p. 19, he 
fortifies his position by constructing a list of definitions, axioms, and 
postulates to refute the Malebranchean thesis that between the act of 
perceiving and its object, there is a tertium quid known as a 
"representative entity." This is not to suggest that Arnauld denies that 
perceptions represent. Like Malebranche, he grants that this is 
undoubtedly the case. Indeed, implied in this concession is the Cartesian 
principle according to which every act of cognition eo ipso correlates with 
an object. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Arnauld, in the first and second 
definitions respectively, accepts that the mind or soul is a substance that 
thinks, and then equates "to think," "to know," and "to perceive." 
Significantly, however, in the third definition he states unequivocally that 
he takes "the 'idea' of an object and the perception of an object to be the 
same thing." This move, on his part, is a crucial step in rejecting 
Malebranche's analysis of cognitive experience into the threefold division 
of (1) the act of perceiving, (2) its direct correlate: the idea, and (3) the thing 
itself, i.e., the indirect object. Since the thought of Descartes is at the 
backdrop of these deliberations, or rather, since it provides the stimulus 
for the issue at hand, I'd like to revert to him for the nonce. 
In Descartes' scheme of concepts, "idea" means whatever can be in 
our thought, and there are, as he illustrates in the third meditation, three 
kinds: "Ex his autem ideis aliae innatae, aliae adventitiae, aliae a me ipso 
factae mihi videntur" (Among these ideas, some seem to be born with me, 
others to be alien to me and to come from without, and the rest to be made 
and invented by myself.) An example of an innate idea is one I have of 
God, triangle, or any eternal essence; of one that is adventitious, it would 
be my idea of the sun; and the example adduced for a constructed or 
factitious idea is the astronomer's version of the sun. Although all three 
kinds of ideas are epistemically different in that they are grasped with 
varying degrees of certainty, one cannot help wondering how, qua ideas, 
i.e„ entities contained in or present to thought, they differ ontologically. 
Cartesian metaphysics posits God as its first truth (its fundamentum 
inconcussum) and the notion of truth in this system of thought is 
inherently deductive. This means, among other things, that reason is 
endowed with the ability to discern every logical turn that the mind makes 
in establishing commerce between God and the world he has caused or 
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created. On this accounting, by the natural light of reason, the mind can 
affirm the validity of a true judgment and accept confidently the reality of 
any object given to it in perception. To put it another way, present in any 
act of awareness is the internal testimony of truth itself: the ultimate 
guarantor of our sense of what is real and true. Since the principal agent 
here is the thinking substance, which constitutes the human interface 
between Cod and the world, what needs to be determined is how the term 
"perception" should be understood. 
According to Arnauld's fifth definition in ldiest "a thing is objectively 
in my mind when I conceive of it. When I conceive of the sun, of a square 
or a sound, then the sun, the square or that sound is objectively in my mind 
whether or not it exists outside of my mind." Arnauld implies that while 
there is a difference between the idea (object of perception) and a thing in 
the world, the idea is a representation of the thing merely in the sense that 
the former contains objectively what is formally in the latter. "Objectively" 
can be here used interchangeably with "cognitively;" and the "formal" 
characteristic of a thing refers to the limited and imperfect manner in 
which it exists in itself. In contrast to these two modes of being, creatures 
exist in God "eminently, i.e., in a way which is more noble than the way they 
are in themselves and which is separated from all the imperfections which 
are inseparably attached to their condition as creatures, in comparison to 
the infinite perfection of the Sovereign Being" (p. 77). In dispensing with 
Malebranche's "representative entity" as a distinct third term, Arnauld 
avoids the possibility of falling into an infinite regress of a coqitatio 
coqilationis Coqitalionis..., 
Having identified the perception with the idea in the third definition, 
Arnauld elaborates on it in the sixth: "I have said that I take the Perception 
and the idea to be the same thing. Nevertheless it must be noted that this 
thing, although only one, has two relations: one to the soul which it 
modifies, the other to the thing perceived insofar as it is objectively in the 
soul; and that the word Perception indicates more directly the first relation 
and the word idea the second" (p.20). The difference here, then, is not 
ontological: there's only a single entity. Rather, Arnauld's distinction is one 
of emphasis: when the focus is on the noetic pole or mental aspect of the 
perceptual situation, the term used is "perception;" when the focus is on its 
noematic aspect or external reference, the term employed is "idea." 
There is, as earlier stated, much more in this book than space allows 
us to cover. Suffice it to say that in it Arnauld, faithful to Descartes' 
principles and writing with Gallic clarity, proves himself to be not only a 
major contributor to the understanding of Cartesian thought but a thinker 
modo suo. The realization of his significance is reflected in the growing 
scholarship that the English-speaking world is currently devoting to his 
work. This new translation of the Idies clearly confirms this fact. Kremer 
provides the reader with an ample introduction comprised of adequate 
biographical information and a lucid, albeit brief, exposition of the content 
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of Idees. In his notes reference is made to three recent books that 
somehow deal with Arnauld: John Yolton's Perceptual Acquaintance From 
Descartes to Reid (University of Minnesota Press, 1984); John Kilcullen's 
Sincerity and Truth, Essays on Arnauld, Bayte and Toleration (Oxford, 
1988); and Stephen Nadler's Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of 
Ideas (Princeton University Press, 1989). Another appropriate title that 
may be added to this list, although not included in Kremer's notes, is 
Patrick Riley's The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of 
the Divine into the Civic (Princeton University Press, 1986). 
Apart from the value that this book can provide as an introduction to 
the thought of Arnauld for those who have limited acquaintance with 
seventeenth-century Cartesianism, by virtue of its critical thrust this study 
can be useful to readers and instructors of Descartes. Elmar Kremer is to 
be commended for the inestimable service he has rendered the 
philosophic community. 
The Authority of Language: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and The Threat of 
Philosophical Nihilism, James C. Edwards, (Tampa: University of South 
Florida Press, 1990), Pp. xi + 249, $ 25.00. Reviewed by Michael J. Quirk, 
Bellerose, New York. 
Many readers of Heidegger and Wittgenstein have sensed that they 
share considerable common ground, despite the monumental differences 
between the style and substance of their respective philosophical 
traditions. In this new book, James C. Edwards makes the compelling 
suggestion that the source of their similarity is a response to the threat of 
philosophical nihilism-the idea that since all our epistemic and moral 
practices can be objectified, or formalized as systems of precise rules, they 
thereby come to seem arbitrary, and thus lose their authority over us and 
fade into meaninglessness. 
The prophet of philosophical nihilism was Nietzsche, who maintained 
that the rejection of a Platonic "higher world" (and its Christian, Kantian, 
and Positivistic variants) would usher in a situation where values would 
devalue themselves. Without a transcendental guarantee, "higher" values 
(such as "truth") would turn out to be nothing other than specific 
manifestations of an impersonal Will-to-Power, which would shatter the 
dominant Western attitude toward their origins and authority. Nietzsche 
believed that the resulting nihilism, where none of our systematic beliefs 
and practices would be adequate from the standpoint of philosophical 
rationality, might be a moment of opportunity for humankind. Freed from 
the illusions of Platonism, "the noble" can joyously and wholeheartedly 
affirm their lives as expressions of Will-to-Power without need of 
philosophical legitimation. But Edwards, following Heidegger, notes the 
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dangers as well as the charms of the Nietzschean "yes": the exemplary 
Nietzschean life is bent on the utter control and domination of all beings. 
Behind the stirring rhetoric of the Übermensch lies the uglier realities of 
technocracy and institutionalized brutality. 
The later Heidegger, as Edwards portrays him, was determined to 
undermine the basis for the nihilism of which Nietzsche warned us, as well 
as his supposed transcendence of it in the affirmation of Will-to-power. 
Heidegger complained that both Nietzsche and his metaphysical rivals 
viewed language, and the articulation of being in language, as a human 
possession and achievement, a capacity to either "find" or "make" the 
world. This elevates the human self to the exalted status of a 
transcendental ego; even Nietzsche, who rejected the metaphysical 
attitude only to reaffirm it in an inverted form, insisted upon the primacy 
of the (super)human. And because of this, nihilism is inevitable. The 
godlike subject of metaphysical reflection cannot consistently objectify its 
own representational or expressive activity. If that were accomplished, the 
ground of representation or expression will have been successfully 
represented or turned into an object and thus lost as a ground. And were 
this metaphysical quest to fail, the "ground of our lives as rational beings 
[would be left] utterly mysterious, and therefore insecure." Either 
alternative is nihilistic. 
For Heidegger, "Die Spracht spricht": not humankind, but "language 
speaks." Representationalist philosophers of language (Locke, Condillac) 
and their expressivist counterparts (Herder, Humboldt, Nietzsche) 
epitomize the humanistic blindness to the ways in which the practices 
whereby we grasp things, and the language wherein they are disclosed, 
constitute and shape us, rather than the other way around. Heidegger 
claims that poetry, rather than metaphysics, shows how and why this is so. 
His interpretation of Trakl's poem "A Winter Evening" highlights the way 
in which the difference between thing and world cannot be 
accommodated to representationalism and expressivism. Just as words 
are the words they are only in the context of a language, so things are 
things only in the context of the referential totality of a world. The poet's 
words show the world which "grants things" by naming the things which 
"bear a world": they do not represent a "found" totality of objects which 
only incidentally comprise a world, nor do they "make" a world by 
imposing order on a void. Poetry, for Heidegger, puts the lie to 
metaphysics by alerting humans to the context of things-in-the-world they 
are "always already" in, and shows the dichotomy between subject and 
object to be derivative and misleading. 
Thus, for Heidegger, the primordial articulation of whole into part, of 
world into things, of language into words and sentences, cannot be a 
matter of mere human activity, for the ability to differentiate and identify 
anything demands a prior articulation. Ontological dif-fcrence (Unter-
scheid), the ultimate difference between beings and Being, is 
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presupposed by all human distinguishing and relating, and thus cannot 
itself be formalized into one more distinction or relation. Rather, it 
constitutes the "open dimension" in which Being reveals and conceals 
itself to human beings, outside the scope of human will. Heidegger harks 
back to the Heraclitean doctrine of being-as-/ogos, toward which we must 
listen and submit as it historically "sends" itself to different epochs and 
cultures. 
Edwards comments that Heidegger's archaism has the power both to 
charm and to chill: while it dissolves the threat of philosophical nihilism, it 
does so by investing language with an authoritarian mystique, where our 
duty is to obey in silence the biddings of the logos. One can question 
whether Heidegger's retrieval and "destruction" of the Western 
philosophical tradition supports this "linguistic fascism"~if the "sendings" 
of Being are historically mutable and diverse, does it make sense to allude 
to the unitary, determinate logos of Heraclitus at all?-but Edwards is 
certainly correct to claim that the rhetoric of Heidegger's later writings 
uniformly leads in this direction, which in turn renders Heidegger's 
reprehensible political convictions all too intelligible. 
Edwards worries whether Heidegger's rejection of "moral rationality"— 
the ideal of the autonomous agent who legislates her behavior in accord 
with the dictates of practical reason—carries too high a price: the 
devaluation of democratic political institutions. He contends that 
Wittgenstein manages to preserve that which is best in Heidegger's 
philosophical achievement without capitulating to an authoritarianism 
that threatens our moral and political identities. 
To measure Wittgenstein's achievement in the Philosophical 
Investigations and other later writings, one must first appreciate the genre 
into which they fall. While they address serious defects and omissions in 
the Tractatus, they do not offer an alternative account of the canonical 
features of language: rather, they call the whole effort of providing such 
accounts into question. When the Tractatus accuses metaphysical 
propositions of being disguised "nonsense," it does so from the vantage of 
a philosophical theory of the necessary logical structure of language itself. 
In contrast, the Investigations' similar charges emanate from the 
perspective of a very different sort of philosophical practice, that of 
assembling "reminders for a particular purpose" which render the doings 
of language "perspicuous," and therefore in no need of any theoretical 
legitimation. Edwards thus sides with those commentators who emphasize 
the rupture between the early and the later Wittgenstein, but goes further 
than most in claiming that, at bottom, Wittgenstein's rejection of the 
Tractatus was rooted in a severe moral judgement against the outlook 
which it epitomized. 
That outlook is an attempt to see the world and ourselves sub specie 
aeternitatis, as objects to be beheld by a detached knowing subject, as 
riddles rather than as mysteries, as cause for curiosity rather than awe. 
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But this view-precisely that which Nietzsche and Heidegger cited as the 
source of nihilism-cannot be accommodated to certain very basic facets 
of our human existence, of which it is the (Wittgensteinian) philosopher's 
job to "remind" us. 
Wittgenstein's critique of nihilism is an oblique one, centering around 
the conception of language as a system of rules advanced in the 
Philosophical Remarks. The Remarks took stock of the problems posed by 
the logical atomism of the Tractatus, where elementary propositions were 
axiomatically assumed to be truth-functionally independent. Color 
predicates show this to be untenable: e.g., The truth of "X is blue at Tj" 
entails the falsity of "X is red at Ti-" But Wittgenstein thought at that time 
that the theory of language as an exact calculus could be salvaged if it was 
not individual propositions which "pictured" the world but systems of 
propositions—language as a whole pictures the world as a whole by way of 
its essential rule-governed order. The Investigations do not seek to refute 
the Remarks on this point: rather they wish to show that its attempt to 
formalize language-or, in a Continental idiom, to objectify human 
linguistic and epistemic practices-does not provide the sort of explanation 
that it claims to provide. It does not answer to "our real need" in posing the 
question about how we come to mean what we say. 
How is it that we can judge whether or not a rule has been 
understood? Given the hypothesis that language is a calculus of fixed 
rules, it is tempting to suppose that our understanding of rules is a 
uniquely mental state or process: our introspective reports establish 
whether or not we have understood what they require. But the process of 
learning any rule-governed system involves imitating the exemplary 
actions of others and submitting oneself to the public judgement of one's 
tutors. Hence whether or not one "understands" is not exclusively a 
mental matter, since it involves the "physical" facticity of appropriate and 
inappropriate responses. It therefore is not justified by any form of 
introspection. Mentalistic, solipsistic philosophies of language do not 
square with what is "perspicuous" in our actual use of rules. 
Rules must be applied, and understanding a rule is not something 
ontologically discrete and separable from knowing how to apply it. just as 
Heidegger maintained that every attribution of difference presupposes a 
prior differentiation, Wittgenstein similarly insists that the mastery of a 
rule-governed system requires a prior assimilation of skills, abilities which 
enable us to project our concepts into new contexts yet still maintain 
enough regularity to render our linguistic innovations plausible. To insist 
that the application of language is "always and everywhere bounded by 
rules" is thus to risk a nonsensical regress: somewhere our reason-giving, 
our rule-following, must come to an end, and our trust in human practices 
take its stead—"this is what we do." 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret Wittgenstein's 
insouciance about rules as a form of conventionalism (the analytic 
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equivalent of "expressivism"). To view conventional stipulation as the 
singular source of meaning is to overlook the fact that human members of 
a linguistic community share not simply "agreement in opinions" but also 
"agreement in judgement" -they share a "form-of-life." We can not shrug 
these off as mere conventions; they cannot be willed into or out of our lives. 
Conventionalists, like their essentialist counterparts, try to detach 
themselves from human practice and human life, in order to gaze upon it 
as if from above and pronounce them "mere conventions": they too are 
infected by the disease of traditional philosophy, the willful, narcissistic 
aspiration to the transparency of a transcendent, omnipotent god. 
Like Heidegger, Wittgenstein concludes that our deepest moral, 
epistemic, and ontological commitments flow from certain "very general 
facts" rooted in our biology, society, and culture, which open up the world 
to discourse and discourse to the world, and which in some sense make up 
the weft and warp of our selves. Like Heidegger, he is consumed by the 
desire to banish the contempt for human finitude epitomized by 
metaphysical and transcendental philosophy. But unlike Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein refuses to let this contempt resurface as Gelassenheit, the 
abject subservience to the voice of being-as-/ogos. The Philosophical 
Investigations does not posit any singular substitute for the loss of singular 
authority: it is the deepest aspect of philosophical pathology to insist upon 
a singular explanation for why our words carry weight. We are left with 
manifold, contingent practices, which manage to sustain our quests for 
meaning and truth, and provide us with the means for rationally extending 
and enriching our lives. They suffice. To expect a more solid ground for 
these efforts, a firm, self-authenticating foundation of necessities, is to be 
victimized by a spiritual pathology which substitutes a vain desire for 
theoretical mastery in place of rapt wonder in the face of the world and our 
grasp of it. 
The Authority of Language is a masterful explication of Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein, and also succeeds in showing how a reading of 
Wittgenstein can both illuminate and allow one to transcend a glaring 
inadequacy in Heidegger's later thought. It is also edifying in the best 
sense of the word, revealing the significance of two rather obscure 
philosophers for life in the (post-) modern era. One troubling question, 
however, remains. Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein doubted the value 
of philosophical theories: their work is a form of therapia, seeking to 
transform rather than inform their audience. But, once converted from 
the transcendental standpoint, that readership needs to find concrete 
moral guidance and support, support which was once provided by, among 
other things, moral theory and religious devotion. Edwards portrays 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein as ambivalent, at best, toward both. But 
neither of them offers an determinate alternative to philosophical theory 
or religion. Heidegger and Wittgenstein are valuable in showing us the 
limitations of the metaphysical-epistemological, or "onto-theological" 
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tradition and its capacity to stifle the sense of amazement that gave rise to 
it in the first place. In effect, they show us how not to think about thinking. 
But as to what might follow their reformed and refreshed philosophical 
practice, we are left without any clear options. It remains for us to consider 
what philosophy might be in their wake. 
The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War, and Thomas Hobbes, 
edited by Peter Caws, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 224 pages. Reviewed 
by Ted Zenzinger, University of Kansas. 
The project of The Causes of Quarrel is at once ambitious and 
valuable. Caws suggests in his introduction that we examine international 
relations from a hobbesian perspective, view the atomic bomb as our 
absolute sovereign, and attempt to find another, more acceptable means 
of achieving peace. The project is ambitious for it entails not only working 
through the complexities of Hobbes' social contract theory, predominately 
the causes of quarrel (competition, diffidence and glory) and their control 
by the sovereign, but it also entails evaluating the political response to 
Hobbes, the determination by the Federalists, and others to secure peace 
without the sacrifice required by an absolute sovereign. If the project 
succeeds, we will not only have gained an understanding of how nation 
states interact, but we may also come to see how we might live in a peace 
not imposed by the fear of mutual destruction. In this we find great value. 
Unfortunately, the project proves too much for one collection of 
essays. Caws makes a gallant attempt in his introduction to hold the 
project together, but the authors of the essays are not to be held in check. 
They embark on favorite topics which, while often interesting in 
themselves, contribute marginally if at all to the stated goal of the 
collection. While we are not, then, in a position to evaluate Caws' project 
(for it remains incomplete), there are connecting threads to be found in 
the essays which we might profitably examine. 
The first thread takes up the value of the contribution Hobbes' 
analysis of the interaction of individuals makes to an understanding of the 
interaction of nation states. Were nation states to behave like hobbesian 
individuals, we would expect them to find it rational to escape the war of all 
against all by giving over their liberties (save self defense) to an absolute 
world sovereign. Martin and Farrell suggest a problem with this analysis. 
Martin brings to the table the serious problem of obligation. Can an 
absolute hobbesian sovereign prevent rebellion and insure peace? The 
answer seems to be no, for Hobbes attempts to combine the liberty of self-
defense with the alienation of all other liberties. In allowing each to 
determine what constitutes harm to self, Hobbes allows each individual to 
undermine the authority of the sovereign by disobeying it whenever the 
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individual so chooses. If nations, like individuals maintain the liberty of 
self-defense, then an absolute world sovereign may be no better able to 
secure peace than the absolute sovereign of a nation state. Knowing this, 
it is unlikely that nation states will agree to establish an absolute world 
government, nor, developing a point made by Farrell, are they likely to be 
willing to transfer their liberty of self-defense to the sovereign. 
Farrell asks whether it is rational for a nation to place itself under the 
control of an absolute sovereign. Given the power of the national state 
today and the horrors inflicted by nation states on one another in the past 
century, is it rational to place one's nation at the mercy of an absolute 
sovereign? Moreover, is it rational for strong nations (those possessing 
nuclear weapons) to give up control of such weapons to the world state and 
thus the means of self-defense? Farrell suggests that it is not rational to do 
so because a nation will not know the likelihood that the sovereign will act 
despotically. Without any knowledge of this likelihood, Farrell suggests 
that the rational nation state will play it safe and choose to retain its 
nuclear weapons and thereby its means of self-defense. There is then a 
serious problem to be addressed even before we discover if the analogy 
between individual and nation state holds, namely the success of Hobbes' 
theory in bringing peace to individuals or nation states. 
A second thread seeks to develop an understanding of glory. Hobbes 
writes of glory as one of the causes of war, but how does it cause war and 
how is it overcome by the sovereign? These are the questions Hampton, 
Sacksteder and Altman address in their essays. Hampton asks an 
important question. Will vain glory disrupt the rational pursuit of self-
preservation? If vain glory is not in some way a rational response to the 
human condition, then there seems little hope of controlling it such that 
individuals can rely upon one another to comply with the social contract. If 
the vain glorious are simply mad, then there is no way to stop them short of 
elimination. And, if all humans are subject to vain glory, there seems little 
hope for peaceful life. 
The perceived worth or value of an individual, Hobbes contends, plays 
a role in the ability of the individual to control resources in both the state of 
nature and in society. But, Hampton reminds us, individual worth is 
instrumental in Hobbes' account; the worth of an individual is determined 
by how much others are willing to "pay" for the services of that individual. 
Those who suffer from vain glory believe that they have a worth higher 
than their market worth. And, if someone assigns them a lesser worth than 
they would assign themselves, they react violently. For, in attacking one 
who assigns to them a lesser worth, the affected individual seeks to 
establish that the person who made the evaluation was not to be believed 
and that their worth is lower than that of the person they devalued, thus 
making the worth of the attacking individual seem greater by comparison. 
Although Hampton's major concern is with individual vain glory, she does 
note that nations can suffer from it as well. When, however, it comes to 
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solving this problem, she can offer no suggestion other than that she 
sometimes despairs of finding an answer. Sacksteder believes that he has 
a. plausible answer to offer. 
Sacksteder argues that glory is the most insidious and destruction 
cause of quarrel among nations, but argues that there is a rational 
response to it. The suggestion is that nations will find it rational to develop 
what Sacksteder calls "mutually acceptable glory." The idea here is that 
the glory which a nation or individual assigns to itself matches that 
assigned to it by other individuals or nations. In effect, all agree to assign 
each other a mutually acceptable level of glory. The suggestion is 
interesting, but left undeveloped by Sacksteder. For example, there is no 
detailed treatment of how the nations or individuals will determine what a 
mutually acceptable level of glory is. It cannot simply be what each nation 
would assign itself, for nations often determine their level of glory in 
reference to other nations. If nation A believes it has more worth and so 
deserves more glory than nation B, and B believes that it has more worth 
than nation A, what is the mutually acceptable level of glory? 
Altman makes a similar point in his response to Hampton and 
Sacksteder. Contra Sacksteder he argues that what is required is not 
mutual recognition of glory, but mutual recognition of sovereignty. He 
notes that liberal democracies have been willing to recognize the 
sovereignty of other liberal democracies because of a shared sense of what 
actions are morally legitimate. Maybe, Altman suggests, the problem we 
face is not that we have nation states, but that we have nation states of the 
wrong type. Perhaps we need to promote the development of liberal 
democracies if we are to secure peace. 
Contra Hampton, Altman suggests that humans, by nature, enjoy 
making others suffer and that we are not the rational egoists Hampton 
supposes. The point at issue here is important to our understanding of 
Hobbes. Hampton's reading of Hobbes seeks to emphasize the rational 
aspect of human nature. Humans must be rational if they are to recognize 
that to avoid the war of all against all they need to enter into a social 
contract which establishes an absolute sovereign. Humans, however, must 
not be so rational that the state of nature does not erupt into the state of 
war, for were this the case, there would be no need for a sovereign. In her 
analysis of glory, Hampton is seeking to show that while glory is a problem 
and a cause of war, it is not something which will preclude rational 
individuals from making the social contract. To make this argument she 
must develop an account of how the absolute sovereign can make 
individuals recognize the irrationality of being vain glorious, and how vain 
glorious individuals can find it rational to enter into the social contract. 
Altman, by comparison, is seeking to emphasize the irrational aspect 
of human nature. Humans are so irrational, so wild, that nothing but an 
absolute sovereign will allow them to live in peace. Proponents of this 
reading of Hobbes face the task of demonstrating how such violent, 
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irrational individuals could make the decision to establish a social 
contract. Behind the scenes of the exchange between Altman and 
Hampton, then, lies a key debate among interpreters of Hobbes. 
The third and final thread we will discuss concerns our understanding 
of peace. Höbbes defined peace as the absence of war; what if we 
attempted to provide a positive definition of peace? This is the question 
addressed by Cox, Caws and Lee. 
Cox suggests that we view peace as a process, one whose goal is 
cooperation. We can make a beginning he argues, by recognizing that 
choosing to interpret events as conflictual is optional. That is, we do not 
have to see ourselves as engaged in conflict if we choose not to. 
Caws endorses the idea that we view peace as a process, but he argues 
that we should focus our attention on the resolution of disputes without 
force. Unlike Cox, Caws recognizes that humans and nations will come 
into conflict with one another, but he argues that they have a choice when 
it comes to the manner in which the conflict will be settled. He, for 
example, suggests that we discuss the disbanding of our standing army 
because standing armies make it easier for us to avoid resolving our 
disputes without use of force. 
Lee seeks to bring together the intuitions of Cox and Caws. He agrees 
that we need to develop a positive conception of peace, but argues that the 
belief that we can redescribe conflict so as to avoid it is simplistic. Further, 
the idea that all interactions are conflictual in nature is an exaggeration. 
We need to recognize that we will encounter situations where cooperation 
is called for and situations where peaceful resolution to conflict is 
indicated. 
In an intriguing final section of his essay Lee argues that nuclear 
weapons have changed the world. They have forestalled cooperation by 
making us fearful and suspicious and they have made conflict without 
threat of force impossible. They have, in addition, made positive peace 
unnecessary for they secure a sort of peace without the need for 
cooperation and non-violent resolution of conflict. They have, as Caws 
remarks in his introduction become an unwanted, perilous absolute 
sovereign. 
